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Abstract: 
Purpose 
– South Africa (SA) has undertaken significant institutional reforms since the change in its political 
regime in 1994. During the same period, SA has also experienced rapid economic growth. Although it 
is widely accepted that institutional reform generally has positive impacts on firm competitiveness 
and economic growth, the extent to which institutional reforms in SA have been of benefit to 
businesses is not well understood. The purpose of this paper is to focus specifically on the rule of law 
and assesses the extent to which the rule of law affects business performance. 
Design/methodology/approach 
– The study uses multinomial logistic regression techniques and data, from a large‐scale firm level 
survey (n=751) of SA businesses undertaken by the World Bank in 2007, to estimate the effects of 
various elements of the rule of law on firm performance. 
Findings 
– Crime and theft were found to have the largest impact on business performance, followed by 
corruption and tax administration. Political instability and the effectiveness of the court system were 
not perceived to affect business performance significantly. 
Research limitations/implications 
– Ongoing institutional reforms aimed at improving business performance and competitiveness in SA 
should pay particular attention to the design of effective policies to address crime, theft, corruption 
and tax administration issues faced by businesses. 
Originality/value 
– The study is one of the first to provide empirical evidence based on a large‐scale survey of the 
extent to which crime and theft, corruption and tax effectiveness inhibit business growth in SA. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The formal institutional environment comprised of government legislation, policies and programs has 
been found to be an important element of international competitiveness and national economic growth 
and development (Ahn and York, 2009; Ismail et al., 2008; North, 1991; Peng, 2010). Not 
surprisingly, institutional building has become a priority in many high‐growth economies such as 
China, India and Russia, and has become a common endeavour in many emerging economies. An 
integral element of the change in political regime which occurred in South Africa (SA hereafter) in 
1994 was the accompanying process of change in the overall formal institutional environment 
underpinning the country's economy. Over the last two decades, SA has also experienced real GDP 
growth rates well in excess of the African regional average rate (The World Bank, 2010b) and has 
become a leading destination for foreign direct investment (FDI), accounting for approximately 17 per 
cent of total FDI in sub‐Saharan Africa in 2009. The 2010‐2011 Global Competitiveness Report also 
ranked SA in 54th place among 139 countries in the world and was noted for its efficiency‐driven 
development (IMD, 2011). The stellar economic performance in recent years also saw the country 
added to the list of the so‐called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) that are reshaping the 
nature, magnitude and direction of global finance, trade and investment. 
 
The indicators above paint the picture of a prosperous country which is poised to become a leading 
regional economy in Africa (Kahn, 2011). However, doubts remain about whether SA has the 
necessary institutional environment to sustain economic growth and the competitiveness of its firms 
(Andreasson, 2011; Kahn, 2011; Nwankwo, 2011; Shoeman, 2011). In particular, little is known 
about how well the institutional infrastructure in SA can support successful entrepreneurship and 
private business ownership, which play critical roles in the overall trajectory of economic 
development (McDade and Spring, 2005; Nwankwo, 2011). To date, there is little empirical evidence 
on how the institutional environment in SA affects business performance and economic growth. To 
the extent that national economic growth and competitiveness are reflected through the collective 
behaviour and performance of firms, an interesting question arises regarding the effects of the 
institutional environment on firm behaviour and performance in SA, which is the subject of this paper. 
 
This research builds on institutional theory in its contemporary form (Ahn and York, 2009; North, 
1992, 2005; Peng, 2010) to focus on how one particular element of the formal institutional 
environment, the rule of law, affects business performance. Institutional theory suggests that the 
nature and dynamism of SA's formal institutional environment necessarily influences economic 
activities in the country by determining the rules, constraints, rewards and incentives of the socio‐
economic behaviour of various players in the economy. The particular focus on how the rule of law 
affects the performance of SA firms addresses three major research gaps in the literature. First, there 
is a paucity of published research on the behaviour and performance of SA firms in general, despite 
their growing regional and global importance (Mbonyane and Ladzani, 2011). Previous studies 
(Verheul et al., 2002; Amine and Staub, 2009) fall short of explaining how well the institutional 
environment can explain the variation in performance of firms in SA. Second, there is little 
understanding of how the profound institutional changes following the change in the political regime 
in 1994 which reshaped the political economy of SA, have impacted on businesses (Andreasson, 
2011; Kahn, 2011). Insights into how firms perceive changes in the institutional environment to have 
impacted their businesses are critical in the design and implementation of effective economic and 
industrial policies for economic growth. Third, there is little understanding of how specific elements 
of the overall institutional environment impact on the performance of firms in the context of emerging 
economies such as SA (McDonald et al., 2006; Naudé et al., 2008; Preuss, 2011; Vaillant and 
Lafuente, 2007). While previous studies have attempted to shed light on the role of institutions, they 
have tended to focus on the macro elements of institutions rather than on the effectiveness of specific 
formal institutions. 
 
Research on the impacts of the rule of law on firm performance in SA remains underdeveloped 
despite common knowledge that the rule of law, as evidenced by high crime rates, theft and declining 
security and safety, has deteriorated in recent years (Mbonyane and Ladzani, 2011; Fraser‐Moleketi 
and Boone, 2003; South African Police, 2010; Pillay, 2004). The rule of law remains one of the 
biggest challenges facing the SA Government in its quest to sustain firm competitiveness and to 
attract FDI (Gould, 2009; Louw, 2005; Nolutshungu, 2011; IMD, 2011). Thus, this study is timely in 
addressing how managers perceive different elements of the rule of law to impact on their businesses, 
and should provide valuable insights to policy‐makers concerned with reforming the rule of law in 
SA. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the literature on institutional 
theory and the rule of law to develop the conceptual model of the study. The research methods and 
data are then presented, followed by the data analysis and the discussion of the results. The 
conclusions, limitations and avenues for future research are contained in the last section. 
 
Review of literature and conceptual model 
Institutional theory, in its contemporary form, explains that institutions serve as the “humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interactions” in order to reduce uncertainty in economic transactions by 
establishing an efficient, predictable and stable structure to exchange (North, 1991, 2005; Peng, 
2010). Institutions are “the rules of the game or humanly devised structures that provide incentives 
and constraints to economic players” (North, 1990, p. 3). The primary role of institutions is to reduce 
uncertainty (Peng, 2010) and risks associated with political instability, social unrest, government 
policies and interference in business operations. Socio‐political risks increase the degree of economic 
uncertainty that can severely impact or even prohibit private economic transactions (Peng, 2010; 
Fogel et al., 2006). Uncertainty has been found to increase transaction and production costs (Ali et al., 
2010; North, 1991; Peng, 2010). Formal institutions help avoid or minimize uncertainty by setting the 
“rules of the game” in the form of formal rules, informal norms, and their enforcement, in order to 
prosecute misconduct and establish an efficient system of seeking redress (North, 1992, 2005). 
According to Peng (2010), understanding formal institutions is particularly relevant in explaining the 
economic development of developing, emerging or in‐transition economies due to their less‐
developed institutional landscapes. This is because in these economies, institutional voids and 
rigidities make it costly for firms to engage in productive economic transactions. In the absence of 
efficient, stable and reliable formal institutions, firms may find it costly to engage in productive 
entrepreneurial undertakings which could subsequently impact negatively on their performance. 
 
For the purposes of this study and with specific reference to the SA context, formal institutions refer 
broadly to the role of government in upholding the rule of law and in setting and implementing a 
sound regulatory framework for business taxation, the provision of adequate business infrastructure 
and the provision of an environment which is free of corruption and crime (Aidis, 2005; Fogel et al., 
2006; Nkya, 2003; Prasad, 2003). A well‐developed? Formal institutional environment provides a 
solid platform for firms to engage in productive economic activities without the constant threat of 
rent‐seeking behaviour (Tambunan, 2007), and creates a level playing field whereby no economic 
player enjoys undue privileges nor is disadvantaged (Meyer, 2001). In sum, a well‐developed and 
functioning formal institutional environment is conducive to firm growth by encouraging 
entrepreneurship (Manolova et al., 2008; Nkya, 2003; North, 2005), free exchange of information 
(Shane, 2003), and protection of property rights (Vatn, 2005). 
 
Rule of law and business performance  
The rule of law constitutes one of the most important components of the formal institutional 
environment. Collectively, it refers to the laws, regulations, government policies and programs, and 
basic infrastructure and services that support the full functioning of a market‐based economy (North, 
1992). The rule of law determines the extent of protection and enforcement of legal rights of the local 
populace including corporate entities such as business firms (Ahn and York, 2009; Fogel et al., 2006). 
A place with a strong rule of law is defined as having sound political institutions, a strong court 
system, and provisions for orderly succession of power, as well as citizens who are willing to accept 
the established institutions and to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes (Oxley and 
Yeung, 2001). The rule of law promotes and sustains peace and order, safety and security which 
constitute the basic elements in creating and nurturing a productive community. The rule of law also 
contributes towards creating a business environment conducive to growth by ensuring the protection 
of property rights (Haggard et al., 2008) and transactional trust (Fogel et al., 2006), and ensures 
financial stability (Hausmann et al., 2005). 
 
But what constitutes the rule of law and how does it affect business performance? In order to identify 
the main factors which characterise the rule of law as they relate to business performance, we draw 
from the works of Daniels and Trebilcock (2004), Licht et al. (2007) and Frye and Zhuravskaya 
(2000), and the realities of the broader institutional environment in SA. Accordingly, the factors 
identified as being most relevant for the purposes of this research include the presence of an 
independent, effective and non‐corrupt judiciary, control of crime and theft through effective law 
enforcement, the existence of an efficient and equitable tax administration system, political stability, 
and the existence of a corruption‐free system of governance, including the delivery of basic 
government services. Together, these factors provide the necessary legal environment to ensure a 
sound environment for businesses to develop and grow. Each of these factors is discussed in the 
succeeding sections below. 
 
Court system: an efficient and transparent court system is necessary for the protection, enforcement 
and restitution of contracts and property rights. Judicial independence, impartiality, accessibility, and 
efficiency are features of a functional court system that has the capability to effectively uphold 
property rights governing business and entrepreneurial activities (Cross and Donelson, 2010). A 
functioning court system also improves transactional trust (Fogel et al., 2006) in the sense that parties 
to a transaction are protected from opportunistic and corrupt behaviours such as cheating and illegal 
deviations from agreed terms. An efficient justice system also serves as a reliable grievance system to 
seek redress when contracts are not honoured. Previous studies have shown the critical role that 
functional judicial or court systems play in fostering an institutional environment that is conducive to 
local entrepreneurial development (Aidis et al., 2008), innovation (Ahn and York, 2009; Chaudhry 
and Garner, 2007), business growth and development (Aidis, 2005), attraction of FDIs (Ali et al., 
2010; Meyer, 2001), and economic growth and development (North, 2005). 
 Political stability provides the necessary environment for firms to prosper and grow through increased 
business confidence brought about by stable, predictable, and reliable political processes. A political 
system that thrives on orderly and transparent transition of power in governance ensures the 
continuity of government services, including the maintenance of peace and order as preconditions for 
building a sound and stable environment for business and investment (Fogel et al., 2006; Daniels and 
Trebilcock, 2004; Manolova et al., 2008). Political stability has been noted as one of the critical 
formal government institutions that impact on entrepreneurship development in Russia and China 
(Aidis et al., 2008; Puffer et al., 2010). A politically unstable country can be characterised by a weak, 
tumultuous and often times transitory political system, where succession of power and authority is 
unpredictable and marred by violence. Political instability increases risks, transaction costs and 
uncertainty in doing business, stifles entrepreneurial activities, deters entry of foreign investments and 
ultimately inhibits economic growth (Roe and Siegel, 2011). 
 
Corruption is defined as abuse of entrusted power for private gain (Transparency International, 2010; 
Calhoun, 2011), and refers to the self‐enriching and self‐gratifying modus operandi of government 
officials from the top of the hierarchy down to the lowest‐level government employee to extract 
personal monetary and non‐monetary gains from every government transaction, whenever possible. 
Corrupt practices entail the abuse of government authority and power to extract private gains through 
bribery, contract kickbacks and embezzlement of government property (Jensen et al., 2010). 
Corruption undermines the overall quality of governance within a country and has wide‐ranging 
negative effects on investment decisions, firm productivity, and national economic growth (Jensen et 
al., 2010). Corruption leads to increased transaction costs due to delays in getting government services 
such as business permits and licenses, uncertainty, and unpredictability of corrupt‐laden government 
administrative machinery. According to the corruption perception index (CPI) published by 
Transparency International (2010), SA was ranked 54th among 178 countries, and fifth among sub‐
Saharan African countries in terms of the most corrupt countries in the world. 
 
Crime and theft are a function of the capability of the government and its agencies, such as law 
enforcement agencies, to maintain peace and order in the community and to prosecute criminals in an 
efficient and timely manner. The prevalence of criminal activities increases the cost of maintaining 
security in business premises and can negatively impact on business performance through increased 
transaction costs (Fogel et al., 2006). Businesses often have to resort to private means of protection 
against crime and theft for their employees and property in countries where crime and theft is out of 
control. The high cost of crime has been noted as one of the major institutional deficits undermining 
business confidence, growth and development and discouraging foreign investment in SA (Mbonyane 
and Ladzani, 2011; Rogerson and Rogerson, 2010). 
 
Tax administration refers to the presence of an equitable and efficient tax system. A burdensome tax 
administration system often represents an institutional obstacle, particularly for small and medium 
enterprises, when tax compliance costs and reporting requirements are excessive relative to the size of 
their business operation. Firms often incur unnecessary operating and transaction costs to meet the 
burden of a tax administration marred by inefficiency, red tape and corruption (Ali et al., 2010; Fogel 
et al., 2006; Puffer et al., 2010). A burdensome and corruption‐laden system of tax administration has 
been found to impair the role of the government in Russia to nurture a business environment that is 
conducive to entrepreneurial growth and development (Aidis et al., 2008). 
 Together, these five elements constitute the main factors which characterise the rule of law within a 
country's broader formal institutional environment. Conceptually, the relationship between the 
different elements of the rule of law and firm performance is shown in Figure 1. It is hypothesized 
that a well‐developed rule of law which is perceived to be efficient, transparent, fair and equitable has 
positive impacts on firm performance by providing a legal environment conducive to business 
development and growth. 
 
Methods and data 
 
In order to assess the extent to which different elements of the rule of law in SA impact on firm 
performance, we proceed by specifying the following econometric relationship between firm 
performance and elements of the rule of law: Equation 1 Where β0, β6 are the regression coefficients 
to be estimated and εi is the error term. The dependent variable PERF is a measure of firm 
performance. The different elements of the rule of law are represented by the explanatory variables 
COURT (court system), POL (political stability), CORUP (corruption), CRIME (crime and theft), and 
TAX (tax administration). We also include the variable SIZE to control for any firm size effects that 
may explain variations in firm performance. 
 
The necessary data for estimation purposes were drawn from the Enterprise Surveys Unit (ESU) of 
the World Bank (The World Bank, 2010a). The ESU conducts regular firm‐level surveys in 
approximately 125 developing countries with the main aim of developing reliable data sets on 
business behaviour and performance in those countries. The ESU survey covers a broad range of 
business environment topics including corruption, infrastructure, crime, competition, and performance 
(The World Bank, 2010a). The ESU surveys are usually administered via face‐to‐face interviews with 
business owners and senior executives in order to ensure higher rates of survey participation, integrity 
and confidence in the quality of data, and confidentiality of survey participants. The survey uses 
stratified random sampling based on firm size (i.e. 5‐19 employees as small; 20‐99 employees as 
medium; and 100 or more employees as large firms), business sector (i.e. manufacturing and service), 
and geographic regions within each country. This data source is considered reliable and has been 
widely used by other researchers in recent years (Amin, 2009; Kaplan, 2009; Hope et al., 2011). 
 
Data for the present study were extracted from the SA file which contained 751 firms. The 
information in Table I which summarises the profile of the sample firms shows that approximately 75 
per cent of the sample consisted of small and medium size enterprises distributed across a broad range 
of industries, with food processing, fabricated metals, garments and chemical manufacturing 
constituting 55 per cent of the sample. The regional distribution of firms in the sample also reflects 
the national concentration of business activities, with the majority (64 per cent) located in 
Johannesburg. In terms of business experience, 74 per cent of firms in the sample are deemed to be 
well‐established with more than six years of business experience. The majority of firms in the sample 
(72 per cent) are also purely domestic and do not engage in any type of international business. 
 
 
 
Measures  
Measures of the dependent and explanatory variables used in this paper were extracted from the ESU 
survey where they are defined as follows: COURT refers to management's perception of the extent to 
which the court system inhibits business performance; POL refers to management's perception of the 
extent to which political instability inhibits business performance; CORUP refers to management's 
perception of the extent to which corruption and corrupt practices inhibit business performance; 
CRIME refers to management's perception of the extent to which crime and theft inhibit businesses 
performance; TAX refers to management's perception of the extent to which the effectiveness and 
fairness of the tax system inhibits business performance. The five explanatory variables referring to 
the rule of law are measured on a five‐point Likert‐type scale anchored at both ends, with 1 – does not 
constitute an obstacle to business at one end, and 5 – constitutes a severe obstacle to business, at the 
other end. The control variable (SIZE) is measured as a 0‐1 dummy variable which controls for firm 
size, where 0 ndash; small and medium size firms based on the number of employees (200 or fewer), 
and 1 – large firms (more than 200 employees). 
 
The dependent variable PERF is a composite measure of the financial, economic and strategic 
dimensions of firm performance. Previous studies have used composite measures of firm performance 
to capture several aspects of the multifaceted nature of the construct, and to maintain parsimony in 
data analysis (Hult et al., 2008; Delaney and Huselid, 1996). Firm financial performance is measured 
as the three‐year average change in sales revenues (Brush et al., 2000). Economic performance is 
measured by the capacity utilisation rates of the firm (Klein et al., 1973), while strategic performance 
is captured by the firm's recruitment activities. Recruitment intentions have been used as a proxy 
which captures a firm's strategic outlook and also reflects the degree of economic confidence in the 
economy (Delmar, 2006; Havnes and Senneseth, 2001). Respondents were asked to rate their 
economic, financial and strategic performance on a five‐point Likert‐type scale, where 1 – performing 
well below expectations, and 5 – performing well above expectations. The overall performance 
measure (PERF) was computed as an average of the three measures above and, in order to ensure that 
all data cells were sufficiently populated, the data were collapsed into a three‐point scale as follows: 1 
– performance is below expectation, 2 – performance is as expected, and 3 – performance is above 
expectation. 
 
Logistic regression estimation and results 
 
Given the qualitative and categorical nature of the dependent variable (PERF), we use multinomial 
logistic regression techniques (McFadden, 1974) available in statistical analysis system (SAS) to 
obtain the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of equation (1). Logit type models assume 
the effects of the independent variables (X) to be linear in the logarithm of the odds ratio of the 
dependent variable; that is, Logit (P)=Log (P/1−P)=α+β′X; where P=Pr(Y=1|X) is the response 
probability to be modelled, and α is the intercept. The estimated β coefficients show the effect of a 
change in the explanatory variables (X) on the logarithm of the odds that a particular choice will be 
made. 
 
The use of categorical and dummy variables also increases the incidence of multi‐collinearity. A close 
examination of the Pearson correlation coefficients among the explanatory variables (Table II) does 
not indicate any serious occurrence of multi‐collinearity. None of the variables that are statistically 
correlated presents any major concern given the low level of correlations (23 per cent or lower). 
 
The maximum likelihood parameter estimates and their levels of significance are summarised in Table 
III. All explanatory variables have the expected signs and are statistically significant at various levels, 
except for COURT. Although the parameter estimate for POL has the expected sign, it is not 
statistically different from zero. The lack of significance for both variables suggests that managers do 
not perceive the effectiveness of the court system and political instability to inhibit the performance of 
their businesses. The results also confirm that corruption (CORUP), crime and theft (CRIME) and tax 
administration (TAX) significantly inhibit the performance of businesses. All three variables have the 
expected a priori signs and are also statistically significant. The control variable (SIZE) is also 
statistically significant, and the positive relationship suggests that larger firms tend to perform better 
than smaller ones. 
 
The results of the current empirical study offer a more nuanced explanation of why and how 
institutions matter to business and economic development in general, and to economic activities at the 
firm‐level in particular. In order to understand the impact of different elements of the rule of law on 
performance, we compute the odds point ratios for CORUP, CRIME and TAX (Table III) to show the 
extent to which a change in each of the variables impacts on the dependent variable. Accordingly, 
crime and theft have the largest impact (0.89), followed by corruption (0.88), and tax administration 
(0.75). The results confirm previous research findings (Mbonyane and Ladzani, 2011; Demombynes 
and Ozler, 2005) that crime and theft remain a major factor affecting business in SA. 
 
An interesting and unexpected finding relates to the non‐significance of the impact of the court system 
and political instability on business performance. A plausible explanation is that SA is known to have 
a well‐functioning system of government and legal framework, as evidenced by the presence of a 
large number of multinational enterprises which trust these institutions. Thus, the development of the 
formal institutional framework underlying the political and legal systems may have attained a certain 
level where their direct impact on business performance diminishes. Peng (2010) argues that when 
markets work smoothly, typically in developed economies, the impact of the institutional environment 
is almost invisible, while poorly functioning markets highlight the presence of weak institutions. 
 
Conclusion, limitations and implications for future research 
 
Institutional building has become a key focus in many developing and emerging countries in order to 
deliver economic growth in an increasingly competitive global marketplace. High‐growth economies, 
such as China and India, embarked on institutional reforms in order to align their economies to the 
realities of the global market place, and to provide an environment which is conducive to business 
development and growth. Such an environment is usually characterised as being business‐friendly 
where transaction costs and administrative barriers are minimal and the rule of law is well‐developed, 
enforced and upheld. Thus, the government plays a critical role in establishing an environment which 
provides firms with a strong base to become internationally competitive. 
 
This paper focuses specifically on the extent to which the rule of law in SA affects business 
performance. The paper is novel in several ways. First, despite common knowledge that the rule of 
law in SA is a major concern for the public in general, no comprehensive research on how the rule of 
law affects businesses has been undertaken to date. Second, this study is among the first to assess 
different elements of the rule of law in the SA context. Third, the paper is also among the first to 
utilise a large data set (n=751) of SA firms obtained from the World Bank. Overall, the paper adds to 
the research literature on SA businesses; an area which remains under‐researched despite the growing 
role of SA in the global economy, and recent recognition that SA is an important emerging economy 
similar to the BRIC economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China). Thus, the topic of this paper is timely as 
it provides valuable insights into the conduct and performance of SA firms in general, and 
specifically, in relation to their perception of the rule of law in SA. 
 
The results suggest that of the different elements of the rule of law, crime and theft, corruption and the 
effectiveness of the tax system are the most urgent areas requiring institutional restructuring. The 
perception of businesses is that these three areas constitute the most immediate constraints to their 
growth and performance. SA has undertaken significant institutional reforms since the change in its 
political regime in 1994, and the results confirm that, as a result, businesses do not perceive several 
aspects of the rule of law, such as the court system and political stability, to be a major constraint for 
firm performance. However, reforms which improve the country's crime and theft rates, corruption 
and the effectiveness of the tax system, should lead to better performance of firms and, thus, deserve 
the urgent attention of policy‐makers. 
 
The legislative and policy frameworks formulated by the Department of Trade and Industry, for 
example in terms of the Companies Act, aim to create a more efficient system of company regulation 
and to identify companies in distress (DTI South Africa, 2011). The Industrial Policy Action Plan also 
includes programs, such as that in the Empowerment and Enterprise Development Division, to create 
enabling environments for SMEs. While these initiatives by the SA Government are commendable, 
particularly their specific focus on SMEs, a more targeted policy intervention, which addresses 
business concerns with crime, theft, corruption and the effectiveness of the tax system, is 
recommended to improve business performance and overall economic growth. Greater research is 
needed to identify the specific aspects of crime, theft and tax reforms, which need to be targeted to 
ensure the effectiveness of policy interventions. 
 
As with any research, this study has a number of limitations. The goal of describing the impact of 
formal institutions in this study is limited by the availability of data generated by the World Bank 
enterprise survey. The questions about the rule of law are broad, such that it is difficult to ascribe a 
particular aspect of the rule of law as a function of national or sub‐national governmental institutions. 
To the extent that the rule of law at the sub‐national levels may also impact business performance, 
future research should usefully distinguish between national and sub‐national institutions. For 
example, corruption may vary widely in different regions purely because of differences in regional 
customs and habits and attitudes. 
 
Formal institutions operate alongside informal institutions. Because formal and informal institutions 
lie in a continuum (North, 1991), their functions, operations, and effects on macro and micro 
economic phenomena are likely to overlap, contradict, reinforce or substitute one for the other. The 
study's focus on a set of macro formal government institutions specific to the rule of law, did not take 
into account the confounding impact of informal institutions such as cultural norms, practices, 
business norms and industry‐based practices. Future research could usefully explore these areas. 
 
Future research may be designed to examine other manifestations of firm performance and 
competitiveness, in addition to the five measures used in the current study. Studies that examine the 
mediating roles of other firm‐level variables, such as absorptive capacity, innovation, and other 
strategic configurations of the firm in the institutions‐firm performance linkages, are worth pursuing 
in the future. Longitudinal studies to account for the dynamic development and evolution of 
institutions are potentially useful, particularly in the SA context, given the structural changes that 
have taken place in the country. Formal institutions do not exist in a vacuum, and tracking the 
progress of government reforms and how they shape the institutional environment over time provides 
an opportunity for policy action. 
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